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TECHNOLOGY’S WAR ON TERROR: THE
NEED FOR PLATFORM ACCOUNTABILITY
IN THE WAKE OF A NATIONAL SECURITY
CRISIS

MEAGAN SCHANTZ*
“[T]errorism today moves at the speed of social media . . . .”1
INTRODUCTION
January 6, 2021.2 A day that “will live forever in infamy.”3 That
day marked the first breach of the United States Capitol Building
since 1814—and the second breach ever in American history (the
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1 The Capital Insurrection: Unexplained Delays and Unanswered Questions (Part II):

Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 117th Cong. (2021) (statement of
Christopher Wray, Director, FBI).
2 On January 6, 2021, thousands of people stormed the United States Capitol Building
during Congress’s Electoral College certification process. Marc Fisher et al., The Four-Hour
Insurrection: How a Trump Mob Halted American Democracy, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2021/politics/trump-insurrection-capitol/. The
insurrection began shortly after President Donald Trump’s “Save America” rally, where the
President told a crowd of supporters, “[w]e’re going to walk down to the Capitol, and we’re
going to cheer on our brave senators[] [and] congressmen and women. You have to show
strength, and you have to be strong.” Id. Members of the crowd proceeded down
Pennsylvania Avenue and surrounded the Capitol, eventually breaching police barricades
and fighting their way into the Capitol Building through broken windows and doors. Id.
The Capitol was put on lockdown. Id. After the Capitol had been unsecured for four hours,
five people were killed and countless others were injured, and the Capitol building suffered
massive destruction. See id.; Amy Sherman, A Timeline of What Trump Said Before Jan. 6
Capitol Riot, POLITIFACT (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.politifact.com/ article/2021/jan/11
/timeline-what-trump-said-jan-6-capitol-riot/.
3 NBC News, Schumer: Jan. 6, 2021 “Will Live Forever in Infamy,” NBC N.Y. (Jan. 7,
2021, 1:13 AM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/politics/schumer-jan-6-2021-will-liveforever-in-infamy/2816513/; 161 CONG. REC. S55 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2022) (statement of Sen.
Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer).
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first was during the War of 1812).4 Five people lost their lives that
day5 and many more were injured in an unprecedented attack on
American democracy. Yet, social media records show that “there
were no surprises” as to what insurrectionists did on that
infamous day.6
The plan to “storm the Capitol” began on less-trafficked social
media sites, the “darker or more-obscure corners of the internet,”
including 8kun (formerly 8chan), Parler, Gab, and Telegram.7
Angered by allegations of voter fraud and a “stolen election,” users
organized an attack on the United States Capitol to prevent the
congressional certification of the national election results.8 Users
discussed which streets to take to gain unfettered access to the
Capitol and which tools to bring to break open the Capitol’s doors.9
Some users inquired as to how violent the siege should get, with
individuals posting about burning the Capitol and one 8kun user
advocating for “Patriots” to “kill cops, kill security guards, kill
federal employees and agents, and demand a recount.”10
Discussions of protest and uprising were not limited to those
sites. Posts about storming the Capitol, although less violent and
graphic, also extended to mainstream platforms such as Twitter,
Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram.11 In December, a digital flyer
4 See Nora McGreevy, The History of Violent Attacks on the U.S. Capitol, SMITHSONIAN
MAG. (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/history-violent-attackscapitol-180976704/.
5 Ben Collins & Brandy Zadrozny, Extremists Made Little Secret of Ambitions to
“Occupy” Capitol in Weeks Before Attack, NBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2021, 12:36 PM), https://www.
nbcnews.com/tech/internet/extremists-made-little-secret-ambitions-occupy-capital-weeksattack-n1253499.
6 Id. (explaining that the Washington, D.C. Attorney General, Karl A. Racine, believed
that law enforcement was aware of the threat posed by extremists on January 6, 2021).
7 Alex Woodward, “Storm the Capitol”: Violence Organised on Social Media as Warnings
of Far-Right Post-Election Went Unheard, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/capitol-riot-was-openlyorganized-on-mainstream-social-media-b1784703.html; see Danielle Abril, Trump
Supporters Flock to MeWe, Gab, and Rumble After Parler goes Offline, FORTUNE (Jan. 11,
2021, 9:16 PM), https://fortune.com/2021/01/11/mewe-gab-rumble-growth-parler-trumpbans-social-media-violence/ (explaining that Parler has since gone offline).
8 The election results were certified, confirming Joseph R. Biden, Jr. as the forty-sixth
President of the United States. Abril, supra note 7; Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (Nov. 27, 2020, 10:56 AM), https://www.thetrumparchive.com/. Since Twitter
suspended Donald Trump’s account, the original tweets are no longer available.
9 See Sheera Frenkel, The Storming of Capitol Hill was Organized on Social Media,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/us/politics/protestersstorm-capitol-hill-building.html.
10 See Collins & Zadrozny, supra note 5.
11 See Woodward, supra note 7.
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titled “Operation Occupy the Capitol” was circulated on Facebook
and Instagram by various right-wing groups.12 On the night before
the Capitol breach, increased traffic was recorded to
“insurrectionist hashtags” on social media, including “1776” and
“Occupy.”13
Approximately twenty minutes before President Trump’s “Save
America” Washington D.C. rally ended, where he advocated for a
takeback of the “stolen election,” the first barricades outside of the
Capitol were breached.14 Thousands of people followed over the
next few hours.15 Once inside the Capitol, insurrectionists posted
Livestream footage and photographs on Reddit, Facebook, Twitter,
and YouTube of a mob storming the halls, breaking into offices,
and stealing classified documents and government property.16
Threats continued on Gab as users in the Capitol posted about
finding Vice President Pence after he refused to overturn the
results of the election.17 Social media erupted as the American
public watched the unprecedented attack from home. Nearly four
hours after the attack began, President Trump posted a oneminute video to his social media accounts.18 He told his followers
in a since-deleted post, “Go home with love & in peace. Remember
this day forever!”19
12 Collins & Zadrozny, supra note 5 (“That call to arms is just one of many warning
signs on extremist sites and mainstream social media platforms that extremist experts say
were easy to spot but ultimately disregarded by law enforcement . . . .”).
13 See id.
14 See Lauren Leatherby et al., How a Presidential Rally Turned Into a Capitol
Rampage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/12/
us/capitol-mob-timeline.html. The impact of the security breach led to increased training of
Capitol Police. See Edward Segal, Capitol Police to Hold First Joint Training Exercise on
Capitol Grounds Since Riots, FORBES (June 5, 2021, 4:46 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/edwardsegal/2021/06/05/capitol-police-to-hold-first-joint-training-exercise-on-capitolgrounds-since-riots/?sh=29addad06ef6.
15 See Leatherby et al., supra note 14.
16 See Sara Morrison, The Capitol Rioters Put Themselves All Over Social Media. Now
They’re Getting Arrested, VOX (Jan. 19, 2021, 6:52 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/
22218963/capitol-photos-legal-charges-fbi-police-facebook-twitter.
17 See Frenkel, supra note 9.
18 See Tasos Katopodis, Trump Tells Capitol Rioters to “Go Home” but Repeatedly
Pushes False Claim that Election Was Stolen, CNBC (Jan. 6, 2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/06/trump-tells-capitol-rioters-to-go-home-now-but-still-calls
-the-election-stolen.html; Kat Lonsdorf et al., A Timeline of How the Jan. 6 Attack
Unfolded—Including Who Said What and When, NPR (Jan. 5, 2022, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1069977469/a-timeline-of-how-the-jan-6-attack-unfoldedincluding-who-said-what-and-when.
19 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 6, 2021, 6:01PM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/. The original tweet is no longer available. Supra note 8.
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In the aftermath, public figures posted on Twitter and other
platforms condemning the violent attack.20 The American public
expressed conflicting perspectives across numerous platforms,
with some social media users condemning the act as one of
domestic terrorism and others hailing the pride and patriotism of
the day.21 Internet “sleuths” emerged on Twitter and Instagram,
posting photos of the protestors and openly naming them to assist
in the FBI’s investigation.22 News of the attack spread around the
world, eliciting international social media content.23 International
terrorist organizations, including ISIS, released online statements
“hailing” the success of the Capitol assault and emphasized how
the domestic unrest “w[ould] pay off” for terrorist organizations.24
On January 8, 2021, in the midst of the rebuilding, President
Trump was suspended and later banned from both Twitter and
Facebook.25
As exhibited on January 6, social media has facilitated global
communication by enabling individuals to connect and share
content almost instantly. While increased connection can be
positive, this expansion of communication has also facilitated the

20 E.g., Meryl Kornfield, What Happened at the Capitol was “Domestic Terrorism,”
Lawmakers and Experts Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/national-security/2021/01/07/domestic-terrorism-capitol-mob/;
Boris
Johnson
(@BorisJohnson), TWITTER (Jan. 6, 2021, 4:06 PM), https://twitter.com/borisjohnson/status/
1346926138057220103?s=12.
21 See Kornfield, supra note 20 (stating that public officials have largely viewed the
attack as domestic terrorism, in contrast with neo-Nazi and far-right extremist groups who
have celebrated the attack and used the event as propaganda).
22 See Morrison, supra note 16. Currently, over 440 suspects have been arrested in
connection to the Capitol insurrection. Clare Hymes & Cassidy McDonald, 440 have been
Arrested in the Capitol Riot Investigation but the FBI is Still Looking for Suspects Accused
of Vicious Attacks on Officers, CBS NEWS (May 7, 2021, 4:47 PM), https://www.cbsnews
.com/news/capitol-riot-arrests-fbi-wanted-officer-assaults-daniel-hodges/.
23 See Ghaith Alsayed, Photograph of Syrian Graffiti Artist Aziz Al-Asmar Creating
Image of Capitol Breach, NBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2021, 1:42 AM), https://www.nbcnews.
com/politics/congress/live-blog/2021-01-08-capitol-riots-electoral-vote-count-n1253384/ncrd
1253520#blogHeader.
24 See Bridget Johnson, ISIS Hails Capitol Riot, Says U.S. Unrest ‘Will Pay Off’ for
Terror Group, HOMELAND SEC. TODAY (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.hstoday.us/subjectmatter-areas/counterterrorism/isis-hails-capitol-riot-says-u-s-unrest-will-pay-off-for-terror
-group/.
25 See Kate Conger & Mike Isaac, Twitter Permanently Bans Trump, Capping Online
Revolt, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/technology/
twitter-trump-suspended.html; Kevin Breuninger, Trump Blog Page Shuts Down for Good,
CNBC (June 2, 2021, 10:03 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/02/trump-blog-page-shutsdown-for-good.html (explaining Donald Trump recently attempted to create his own
blogging site, “From the Desk of Donald J. Trump,” but the site was permanently shut down
in June 2021).
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circulation of terrorist and extremist content.26 For many users,
terrorism is not a part of the daily social media experience.
However, its absence in “mainstream” social media is not
representative of the wider landscape. Between August 2015 and
December 2017, Twitter suspended 1,210,357 accounts for
promoting terrorist content.27 From June to December 2017,
YouTube removed approximately 150,000 videos for promoting
extremist content.28 In 2018, Facebook “took action” on 9.4 million
posts associated with al-Qaeda and ISIS.29
The threat of both international and domestic terrorism is
largely perpetuated by social media because social media is a
platform for recruitment and communication. Although social
media platforms already have regulatory methods to remove
content deemed unfit under a website’s community standards,30
greater action is needed to prevent the spread of terrorism on
social media. Accordingly, this note proposes that social media
companies be held liable when social media plays a clear role in
the planning, organizing, and execution of an attack.31 The current
law, specifically section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
and the Anti-Terrorism Act, absolves social media companies of
26 See U.S. NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING DOMESTIC
TERRORISM (2021) https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/NationalStrategy-for-Countering-Domestic-Terrorism.pdf. Social media allows users to connect
around the world, expediting the spread of news and other content. Id. Alongside those
benefits, however, is the frightening spread of terrorism. See id. Recently, President Biden
recognized this threat in his plan to counter domestic terrorism, which includes increasing
resources, strengthening the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee, and working
privately with social media companies. See id.
27 See Stuart Macdonald et al., Regulating Terrorist Content on Social Media:
Automation and the Rule of Law, 15 INT’L J. OF L. IN CONTEXT (SPECIAL ISSUE) 2–3 (2019)
(stating that Twitter improved its AI processes from 2013-2014 statistics, where algorithms
seemingly connected at-risk users with extremist pages).
28 See id. at 3.
29 Monika Bickert & Brian Fishman, Hard Questions: What Are We Doing to Stay
Ahead of Terrorists?, META (Nov. 8, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/11/stayingahead-of-terrorists/.
30 See
Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://m.facebook.com/community
standards/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2022); FACEBOOK, Content Standards Forum- December 11,
2018, https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/12.11.18-Content-Standard-ForumMinutes-.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2022) (stating that Facebook removes content that
“expresses support or praise for [terrorist] groups, leaders, or individuals”).
31 A specific standard of review is beyond the scope of this note. While playing a “clear
role in planning, organizing, and execution” suggests a threshold of gross negligence, it is
beyond the scope of this note to determine the exact standard as to how extreme the failure
to act must be. For example, determining the minimum number of views on certain
extremist content that would signal gross misconduct in failing to remove a post would
likely not be feasible. Furthermore, if such standards were set, that would raise other issues
regarding manpower, costs, enforcement, etc.
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responsibility for terrorist attacks that start and develop on social
media platforms.32 This note argues that section 230 should be
amended to reduce the broad immunity provided to social media
platforms. This amendment would result in increased liability for
social media companies in social media-related terrorism, thereby
advancing the safety and security of society and promoting the
legal rights of victims and their families by incentivizing social
media platforms to take care that they do not enable the planning,
organizing, or execution of terrorist attacks. Additionally, the
Anti-Terrorism Act should be amended to provide legal recourse
for domestic terrorist attacks to force social media companies to
identify and remove posts that threaten domestic terrorism and
provide an opportunity for victims and their families to bring legal
action.
Part I of this note will address the presence of terrorism on social
media. Part IA will provide a background of social media, showing
that increased regulation of terrorist content is critical due to
social media’s widespread accessibility and popularity in society.
Part IB will provide a comprehensive overview of how social media
platforms address terrorism on their sites, including the content
that social media companies look for and methods of mitigation
and removal; this section will also address the threat of terrorism,
specifically the existence of both international and domestic actors
who post terrorist content, on social media. Part IC will explain
the current regulations affecting social media content and
terrorism within the United States. These regulations include
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and the AntiTerrorism Act (ATA); the former focuses on the protections
provided to social media platforms, whereas the Anti-Terrorism
Act focuses on acts of terrorism.
Part II will propose that section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act and the Anti-Terrorism Act be amended to hold social
media companies accountable for the publication of terrorist
32 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of—any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access or [availability] of material that . . . the user considers to be . . . excessively violent
. . . .”); Crosby v. Twitter Inc., 921 F.3d 617, 628 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that Twitter was
not liable for the execution of the Pulse Nightclub attack); Fields v. Twitter Inc., 881 F.3d
739, 741 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that Twitter was not liable for the murder of two United
States government contractors in Jordan, despite the shooter’s engagement with ISIS
content on social media).
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content on social media platforms.
Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act should be amended by rolling back
the broad immunity provided to network operators. By amending
the scope of coverage that section 230 offers, social media
companies will be more accountable for monitoring threats to
national security. Furthermore, victims of terrorist attacks will
have legal recourse against otherwise “off-limits” social media
platforms.
However, Part II will also explain that a balance must be struck
to ensure that liability is narrowly defined, so as not to place an
undue burden on social media companies. Additionally, the AntiTerrorism Act should be amended to allow recovery for both
international and domestic terrorist attacks. Expanding the
statute to include domestic terrorist attacks would place greater
pressure on social media companies to identify and remove
domestic terrorist content and would provide a broader scope of
redress for victims and their families.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Social Media is a Staple of Modern Society
Social media networks enable users to connect in previously
unimaginable ways. Due to its accessibility and convenience,
social media has become a critical force in American society and
around the world. Because of the large, powerful role social media
plays in modern society, regulation must be implemented to
ensure that social media companies take extra care to maintain a
safe online environment.
Social media is defined as “forms of electronic communication
(such as websites for social networking and microblogging)
through which users create online communities to share
information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as
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videos).”33 The growth of these networks began in the 1990s as
online blogging became increasingly popular.34 The first social
platforms, including Friendster and MySpace, developed in the
late 1990s and early 2000s.35 While those sites enjoyed the
majority of the social media market for several years, they were
later replaced with sites like Facebook in 2004 and Twitter in
2006, which offered different user experiences and consequently
pulled users away from the original platforms.36 This trend of
fluctuating platform popularity continues today, as sites such as
Telegram and Gab continue to grow, threatening to do to Facebook
and Twitter what those sites did to Friendster and MySpace in the
early 2000s.
Social media is a staple of modern society: about 70% of adults
use at least one platform.37 According to a 2018 study conducted
by the Pew Research Center, more than two-thirds of Americans
get some form of news from social media sites.38 Namely, 43% of
Americans get their news from Facebook, 21% from YouTube, and
12% from Twitter.39 Consumption of social media news, and
people’s preferences of platforms, are largely dependent on factors
such as race, gender, age, and political affiliation.40 For example,
26% of social media users aged 18-29 prefer to receive their news
from Facebook, compared to 40% of social media users aged 30-49
who use Facebook as their primary news source.41 More than half
33 Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
social%20media (last visited Mar. 1, 2021). For the purposes of this note, the term “social
media” will be confined to digital platforms, such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.
34 See Matthew Jones, The Complete History of Social Media: A Timeline of the
Invention of Online Networking, HIST. COOPERATIVE (June 16, 2015), https://history
cooperative.org/the-history-of-social-media/. As accessibility to the Internet increased,
users enjoyed the ability to write about their daily experiences and know that their friends
and families could read them. Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. Twitter allowed users to post 140 characters per Tweet (now 280 characters) to
their list of “followers.” Id. Facebook, originally branded as a college website, allows users
to post a variety of media to their “friends.” Id.
37 Summer Allen, Social Media’s Growing Impact on Our Lives, AMERICAN PSYCHOL.
ASS’N (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.apa.org/members/content/social-media-research
(“Whereas only five percent of adults in the United States reported using a social media
platform in 2005, that number is now around 70 percent.”).
38 Elisa Shearer & Katerina Eva Matsa, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2018,
PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.journalism.org/2018/09/10/news-use-acrosssocial-media-platforms-2018/ (“About two-thirds of American adults (68%) say they at least
occasionally get news on social media, about the same share as at this time in 2017 . . . .”).
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id.
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of Americans expect social media news to be “largely inaccurate”;
nevertheless, most still rely on their social media platforms for
news out of convenience.42
Because of their large role in our daily lives, social media
platforms are consistently scrutinized.43 Recently, there has been
a greater call for platforms to act against harmful speech, such as
hate speech and misinformation.44 Campaigns like Stop the Hate
for Profit have garnered attention from celebrities and large
companies alike, advocating for social media platforms to adopt a
tougher position on offensive content and language. 45 Indeed, as
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have attempted to strengthen
their campaigns against misinformation in the wake of the
presidential election, sites like Telegram and Gab have attracted
users on the allure of promoting “free speech.”46 Telegram and Gab
are not as popular as the mainstream platforms, but the continued
movement of users based on politics and ideology reflects the
expansive landscape of social media. While the campaigns against
hate speech and misinformation and calls for action are important
steps in the right direction, more work needs to be done to combat
the presence of terrorism on social media by making social media
42 See id. (“A majority (57%) say they expect the news they see on social media to be
largely inaccurate.”).
43 See Lee Raine, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of
Privacy Concerns, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-media-in-an-era-of-privacyconcerns/ (“In addition to the concerns about privacy and social media platforms uncovered
in our surveys, related research shows that just 5% of social media users trust the
information that comes to them via the platforms ‘a lot.’”).
44 See Barbara Ortutay & Tali Arbel, Social Media Platforms Face a Reckoning Over
Hate Speech, AP NEWS (June 29, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/6d0b3359
ee5379bd5624c9f1024a0eaf (“For years, social media platforms have fueled political
polarization and hosted an explosion of hate speech. Now, with four months until the U.S.
presidential election and the country’s divisions reaching a boiling point, these companies
are upping their game against bigotry and threats of violence.”).
45 See STOP HATE FOR PROFIT, https://www.stophateforprofit.org/ (last visited Oct. 18,
2020). Stop the Hate for Profit advocated for a boycott of Facebook until the platform
claimed responsibility for hate speech posted on the site. See Statement from Stop Hate for
Profit on July 2020 Ad Pause Success and #StopHateforProfit Campaign. Through ad
boycotts from businesses and individual user boycotts, Stop the Hate sought to slow profits
in exchange for a policy change towards “hate, bigotry, racism, antisemitism, and
disinformation.” See #StopHateForProfit September 2020 Week of Action. Although this
note does not focus on hate speech, these campaigns show a greater public pressure to
regulate harmful content.
46 See Alex Newhouse, Right-Wing Users Flock to Parler as Social Media Giants Rein
in Misinformation, PBS (Dec. 3, 2020, 1:27 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/rig
ht-wing-users-flock-to-parler-as-social-media-giants-rein-in-misinformation
(explaining
that Parler and other sites attracted members of the “polarized public,” who are able to
further conspiracy theories through this unregulated platform).
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companies accountable for the harmful content posted on their
platforms.
B. Social Media-based Terrorism is a Complex Issue that
Requires Multifaceted Solutions
Terrorism on social media remains a significant threat to
national security in the United States. Terrorist organizations
utilize social media to recruit members, disseminate propaganda,
and broadcast violence to instill fear in others.47 Social media
platforms have responded by implementing regulatory policies to
mitigate the spread of extremism. However, these policies, alone,
are insufficient.
i. Social Media is Used by Terrorist Organizations to
Recruit, Disseminate Propaganda, and Broadcast
Violence.
Social media is used as a tool to advance various terrorist
organizations’ interests through, for example, recruiting,
communicating through the publication of propaganda, gathering
intelligence, and instilling fear.48 According to a study conducted
by Gabriel Weimann of the University of Haifa, approximately
90% of “organized terrorism” takes place on social media.49 This
significant statistic is attributable to accessibility, cost, and the
ability to disseminate widespread messages.50 According to the
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (START),
Nearly two-thirds of extremists used Facebook for
radicalization or mobilization. . . . YouTube was the
second most frequently used platform among
47 See WIKIPEDIA, INFORMATION, PEOPLE, AND TECHNOLOGY, at 192 (2005) (citing a
terrorism on social media study).
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See id.
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extremists, with a usage rate of nearly one third.
The third most popular social media platform was
Twitter, which was utilized by nearly a quarter of
extremists . . . .51
A social media platform may serve as a source for direct
communication between organizations, or an organization and an
individual, for recruitment or radicalization.52 According to Dr.
Erin Marie Saltman, who managed Facebook’s counterterrorism
policies, the internet itself does not radicalize a vulnerable
individual or population; it merely serves as a catalyst for
extremism by providing “tools, scale, and rapidity that doesn’t
exist elsewhere.”53 This concept was particularly apparent during
the COVID-19 pandemic, where disenfranchised teenagers
expressed an interest in extremism in the wake of lockdowns,
isolation, and more time spent on social media.54
Social media has played a critical recruitment role for
organizations like ISIS.55 According to Dr. Saltman, social media
redefined the idea of a “cloaked, dark figure of a jihadist”
attempting to lure vulnerable individuals in.56 Instead, extremists
took a more “human” approach to social media and posted about
their wedding days, the births of their children, cooking, and
gaming culture.57 Such content facilitates recruitment, as
communication about seemingly ordinary topics evades platforms’
user policy enforcement mechanisms.58 However, when the
dialogue develops into an illegal conversation, many “recruiters”
51 Michael Jensen et al., The Use of Social Media by United States Extremists, START,
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_PIRUS_UseOfSocialMediaByUSExtremists_Res
earchBrief_July2018.pdf.
52 See WIKIPEDIA, supra note 47.
53 Erin Marie Saltman, How Young People Join Violent Extremist Groups – and How to
Stop Them, TED (Sept. 2017), https://www.ted.com/speakers/erin_marie_saltman.
54 See Jamie Grierson, Children Showing Interest in Extremism, Says Senior Officer,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2020, 10:27 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/
sep/23/children-interested-in-extremism-covid-says-neil-basu-counter-terrorism-officer
(“When you’ve been locked down, with social media having such an influence on every single
one of us in our daily lives, and you’re able to sit there and just take all that in on a
permanent basis with no other form of distraction or protective factor around you . . . that
is a concern.”).
55 See Saltman, supra note 53.
56 Id.
57 See id.
58 See id. (explaining that content moderators would have no cause for concern,
assuming that the moderator was not aware of previous records or extremist history,
regarding two users discussing video games or cooking).
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know to move the discussion to a less regulated social media
platform.59 Therefore, despite platform regulations, recruitment
can progress rapidly and essentially depart from the regulated
grid before it can be thoroughly investigated.
Social media may also be used as a platform to disseminate
propaganda directly, a method first used by al-Qaeda and later
accelerated by ISIS.60 ISIS propaganda promotes five key themes:
strong governance and authority, military power, true religion, a
call to action (Jihad), and fighting the global oppression of
Muslims (the Umma).61 This propaganda can range from images
depicting a sense of brotherhood and community62 to violent,
gruesome videos of executions and beheadings.63 The latter
category of distributed content is typically referred to as
“propaganda of the deed” (POTD).64 POTD refers to “an act of
political violence with the objective of creating a media event
capable of energi[z]ing populations to bring about state revolution
or social transformation.”65 POTD is considered a form of
terrorism, though not all terrorism constitutes POTD.66 This
violent imagery is used to further the themes of Jihad and the
oppression of the Umma.67 For example, by depicting a missile
strike or bombing of a small, predominantly Muslim town, alQaeda (or the original publisher) furthers their theme of fighting
Western nations’ oppression and execution of Muslim

59 See id. (stating that when actual, illegal details of recruitment or crime are raised,
perpetrators know to move the conversation off of regulated sites like Facebook).
60 See WIKIPEDIA, supra note 47.
61 See The Redirect Method, MOONSHOT, https://moonshotteam.com/redirect-method/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2021). The Redirect Method is a pilot experiment organized by
communication advisory networks to explore the impact of terrorist recruitment methods
online. See id. Through media initiatives, the Redirect Method collected data on social
media terrorism and created its own content to combat the threat. See id.
62 See Saltman, supra note 53 (showing photographs depicting a group of Muslim
women with the caption, “sisterhood”).
63 See WIKIPEDIA, supra note 47; Marilyn W. Thompson, ISIS Murdered Her Son. But
She Wasn’t Going to Let that be His Only Legacy, WASH. POST (May 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/isis-murdered-her-son-but-she-wasntgoing-to-let-that-be-his-only-legacy/2018/05/08/138b34e6-3ced-11e8-a7d1-e4efec6389f0_st
ory.html (discussing American journalist Jim Foley, whose gruesome murder by ISIS was
posted on YouTube).
64 NEVILLE BOLT, THE VIOLENT IMAGE 2 (2012).
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 47.
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individuals.68 This media, though often taken out of context, has
proven to be a successful recruitment tactic.69
Social media platforms may also be used for broadcasting violent
acts and garnering post-act publicity as a way to instill fear. For
example, in 2019, a group of neo-Nazi extremists entered two
mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, and murdered 49
worshippers.70 The shooting was recorded on a GoPro helmet
camera and was simultaneously live-streamed on Facebook and
reposted on Twitter and YouTube.71 Exposing users to a deadly
attack as it is occurring fulfills terrorism’s purpose of instilling
fear, particularly in Western countries.72 Although the video was
removed, images of the shocking attack remained on social media
via news coverage.73 The impact of these posts cannot be
understated. The Christchurch attack was cited in the unsigned
manifesto believed to be associated with Patrick Crusius, the
twenty-year-old gunman who murdered twenty people in an El
Paso Walmart.74
The use of social media by terrorist organizations for such
purposes has led platforms to explicitly identify prohibited content
that violates their rules and standards. Using legal definitions
and independent criteria, each platform reviews and removes
content as it deems necessary.

68 See id. (explaining that emotional content, even that which is inaccurate, assists in
the process of radicalization).
69 See id. at 47.
70 See Max Boot, Why Social Media and Terrorism Make a Perfect Fit, THE WASH. POST
(Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/16/why-social-mediaterrorism-make-perfect-fit/.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id. This note is not advocating for the censorship of legitimate news coverage,
because the public should be informed of attacks. However, posts that glorify such attacks
should be removed.
74 Tim Arango et al., Minutes Before El Paso Killing, Hate-Filled Manifesto Appears
Online, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/us/patrick-crusiusel-paso-shooter-manifesto.html. On August 3, 2019, Patrick Crusius killed twenty people
and injured at least twenty others after a mass shooting in a Walmart in El Paso, Texas.
Before driving almost ten hours to Walmart, Crusius released an unsigned, “antiimmigrant” manifesto online. The manifesto praised the Christchurch shooting and
condemned the “Hispanic invasion of Texas.” See id.
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ii. Social Media Platforms Set the Standards for
Prohibited Content
Each social media platform has a set of rules and guidelines that
regulate user behavior, including prohibitions on dangerous or
violent individuals and organizations.75 Content that violates
these guidelines often results in a deletion, as well as possible
account suspension.76
Facebook removes posts related to terrorism and restricts
terrorists and terrorist organizations from obtaining Facebook
accounts.77 Facebook defines a terrorist as “any non-state actor”
that,
(1) Engages in, advocates, or lends substantial
support to purposive and planned acts of violence;
(2) Which causes or attempts to cause death, injury
or serious harm to civilians, or any other person not
taking direct part in the hostilities in a situation of
armed conflict, and/or significant damage to
property linked to death, serious injury or serious
harm to civilians;
(3) With the intent to coerce, intimidate and/or
influence a civilian population, government, or
international organization; and
(4) In order to achieve a political, religious, or
ideological aim.78
Accordingly, any posts that display an act of terrorism, a symbol
of a terrorist organization, or praise for an organization or act of
75 For the purposes of this section, I will focus on primarily Facebook and Twitter’s
guidelines. See Dangerous Individuals and Organizations, META, https://www.facebook
.com/communitystandards/dangerous_individuals_organizations (last visited Jan. 5, 2021)
(providing the “Community Standards” of Facebook); Violent Organizations Policy,
TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/violent-groups (last visited Jan. 5,
2021) (providing the community guidelines of Twitter).
76 See DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 74; VIOLENT
ORGANIZATIONS POLICY, supra note 75.
77 Facebook initially focused on accounts and content relating to ISIS and al-Qaeda,
which resulted in the removal of twenty-six million posts. See Dangerous Individuals And
Organizations, supra note 75; Combating Hate And Extremism, META (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/combating-hate-and-extremism/.
78 See DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 74.
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terrorism is removed.79 Facebook has commented that those
standards are likely to change and that an updated definition
would emphasize that a post must “attempt violence, particularly
when directed toward civilians with the intent to coerce and
intimidate . . . .” to violate its policy.80 By expanding the definition
and incorporating violence as a standard for removal, Facebook’s
rule seemingly bridges the gap between preventing censorship of
vague, potentially harmless content and removing terrorist
content.
Twitter relies on “national and international terrorism
designations,” as well as its own set of criteria, to determine what
constitutes terrorist content.81 Twitter defines “violent extremist
groups,” which include terrorist organizations, as groups who,
(1) Identify through their stated purpose,
publications, or actions as an extremist group;
(2) Have engaged in, or currently engage in, violence
and/or the promotion of violence as a means to
further their cause; and
(3) Target civilians in their acts and/or promotion of
violence.82
Like Facebook, Twitter explains that violations of this policy
include using a terrorist organization’s symbol, recruiting for the
organization, participating in violent acts on behalf of the
organization, and providing services for the organization.83 Such
violations result in the removal of harmful content and account
suspension.84 Based on these guidelines, social media platforms
utilize regulatory policies to monitor, and subsequently remove,
content that violates platform standards.

79
80
81
82
83
84

See id.
See COMBATING HATE AND EXTREMISM, supra note 77.
See VIOLENT ORGANIZATIONS POLICY, supra note 75.
See id.
See id.
See id.

5 - SCHANTZ MACORS (DO NOT DELETE)

9/18/2022 8:22 PM

166 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Vol. [36:1

iii. Social Media Platforms Utilize Regulatory Methods to
Remove Terrorist Content
To determine if the content meets a site’s prohibited standards,
social media platforms have responded by implementing their own
regulatory methods, and these methods include the use of human
intelligence and Artificial Intelligence (AI) which identify harmful
content through algorithms and digital patterns.85
1. Artificial Intelligence as a Method of Content
Regulation
AI regulation uses algorithms and digital identifiers, known as
hashes, which regulate content through digital codes and
patterns.86 According to Facebook’s Head of Global Policy
Management, Monika Bickert,87 terrorist propaganda is easily
recognized by machines and algorithms due to common patterns
and phrases.88 Such content will often be caught before publication
and will be blocked from dissemination.89
In 2016, social media companies began collaboratively working
to record and share common patterns and phrases through the
Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT).90 This pact,
in which Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube are all
members, grants organizations access to a “shared industry hash
database” that allows members to share “digital fingerprints for
85 See Bickert & Fishman, supra note 29 (stating that Facebook has enacted “machine
learning” in conjunction with human review).
86 See id.
87 This paragraph will primarily focus on Facebook’s counterterrorism policies because
Facebook is the most transparent platform in terms of its pre-existing policies and new
developments. See id.
88 Clea Simon, The View from Inside Facebook, HARV. GAZETTE (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2018/12/facebook-leader-sits-down-with-harvardsjonathan-zittrain/. Facebook utilizes “Natural Language Understanding,” which is an AI
process that interprets content into more manageable patterns and categories of human
speech. See Natural Language Understanding At Facebook, META, (Apr. 19, 2017),
https://developers.facebook.com/videos/f8-2017/natural-language-understanding-facebook/.
89 See Simon, supra note 88. This type of regulation is often referred to as nonnormative regulation. See Macdonald et al., supra note 28, at 184.
90 See Macdonald et al., supra note 27 at 184; Update on the Global Internet Forum to
Counter Terrorism, TWITTER PUB. POL’Y (Dec. 4, 2017), https://blog.twitter
.com/en_us/topics/events/2017/GIFCTupdate.html.
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terrorist content” that can be utilized to recognize common
elements of extremism.91 Currently, the GIFCT database contains
200,000 digital hashes that allow member organizations to
“identify and remove matching content that violates
. . . [respective] policies – and sometimes block such [terrorist]
content before it is even posted.”92
Such technological safeguards are critical, but they are not
infallible. For example, algorithms cannot always pick up on the
“subtleties of expression,” such as sarcasm or tone.93 Furthermore,
the permissibility of language is heavily context-dependent. 94 For
instance, the Facebook Oversight Board issued its first five
opinions in 2021, one of which involved the removal of a quote
incorrectly attributed to Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Minister of
Propaganda of Nazi Germany.95 The Oversight Board overturned
Facebook’s decision to remove the quote, recognizing that although
Goebbels is on Facebook’s “Dangerous Individuals and
Organizations” list, the post was not praising or glorifying him.96
Such cases reflect the shortcomings of AI, namely the mistakes
that can occur through flagging non-extremist material or
conversely, failing to detect harmful threats. For these reasons,
human-operated regulations are required to ensure that terrorist
content does not go undetected.

91 Update on the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, TWITTER PUB. POL’Y (Dec.
4, 2017), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/events/2017/GIFCTupdate.html.
92 Macdonald et al., supra note 27, at 184.
93 To illustrate, posting “I’m going to kill you” may be interpreted as a threat by an AI
program, even when it was intended to be a joke. See Simon, supra note 88; Danielle Keats
Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1035, 1054–55 (2017).
94 See Simon, supra note 88 (explaining how Facebook analyzes hate speech through a
tiered system, where questionable phrases or terms that have not been defined are referred
to one or more of the company’s various content reviewers).
95 Oversight Board Overturns Facebook Decision: Case 2020-005-FB-UA, FACEBOOK
OVERSIGHT BD. (Jan. 2021), https://oversightboard.com/news/141077647749726-oversightboard-overturns-facebook-decision-case-2020-005-fb-ua/. In October 2020, a user posted a
quote “incorrectly attributed to Joseph Goebbels” in reference to President Trump. Id. The
quote did not show photos of Goebbels, nor were there any references to Nazi symbols. Id.
Nevertheless, the quote was removed for violating the “Dangerous Individuals and
Organizations” Community Standard. Id.
96 See id. (noting that the removal of the post, which did not support the Nazi regime,
should not have been removed pursuant to the unclear Dangerous Individuals and
Organizations criteria).
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2. Human Intelligence as an Additional Method of
Content Regulation
In addition to technological safeguards, social media platforms
have human-operated regulatory methods that monitor and
remove terrorist content. On the ground level, social media users
are expected to report content that violates the platform’s
standards, such as posts “celebrat[ing] or glorify[ing] violence.”97
This regulatory method, a normative method, is founded on the
idea that users will self-police their social media community and
bring attention to content that is not “fun and enjoyable for
everyone.”98 According to YouTube and Twitter’s community
values, this appears to be the primary manner of reporting
terrorist content.99
On a more organized level, suspected and convicted terrorists
and their networks are tracked and removed from social media
sites with help from news sources, government agencies, and
activists.100 For example, Facebook implemented a “fanning-out”
process in which multilingual teams examine the pages liked, or
events attended, by terrorists and their associated groups.101
Through both Community Operations teams102 and more than 150
“terrorism and safety specialists,” Facebook scrutinizes posts and
previous history to draw connections between suspect pages and

97 Natalie Andrews & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Steps up Efforts Against
Terrorism, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2016, 7:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooksteps-up-efforts-against-terrorism-1455237595 (stating that violent images or posts
supporting an act of terrorism should be reported by independent users).
98 Social media sites operate with the expectation that users will flag or report
disturbing content, such as images and videos depicting violence. These “human
intelligence” methods work in conjunction with AI methods. See Macdonald et al., supra
note 27, at 185.
99 See Violent Criminal Organizations Policy, GOOGLE: YOUTUBE HELP (last visited
Jan. 1, 2021), https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/9229472?hl=en; Addressing the
Abuse of Tech to Spread Terrorist and Extremist Content, TWITTER PUB. POL’Y (May 15,
2019), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/addressing-the-abuse-of-techto-spread-terrorist-and-extremist-c.html (illustrating that self-reporting appears to be the
primary method of regulation).
100 See Andrews & Seetharaman, supra note 97.
101 Id.
102 Community Operations addresses users’ concerns on a variety of topics, including
flagged content, internet connection, and reporting bugs or glitches in the system. See
Community Operations at Facebook, META CAREERS (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.facebook.
com/careers/life/community-operations-at-facebook.
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profiles.103 In conjunction with that process, terrorists’ profiles are
also removed directly from the site.104
Like with AI-based regulation, human regulation has its
shortcomings, however. With more than 70% of American adults
using social media,105 millions of posts are created and shared
daily. Accordingly, it is not feasible for an individual to review and
analyze every post to determine the level of the threat or if one
exists at all.
3. Social Media Platforms Have Implemented
Alternative Regulatory Approaches
In addition to using AI and “human intelligence” to analyze and
report harmful content, social media platforms have implemented
alternative methods of mitigating the spread and impact of
terrorist content. One such form of combatting terrorist content
on social media is called “counterspeech.” According to the
Dangerous Speech Project (DSP), counterspeech is a response
intended to refute or undermine “hateful or dangerous speech
online.”106 Counterspeech manifests itself in many different forms,
including direct counterspeech (the counter speaker directly
addresses the original speaker), as well as through the “contagion
effect” (consistent exposure to positive counterspeech, which elicits
the desire to also contribute counterspeech).107

103 See Monika Bickert & Brian Fishman, Hard Questions: How We Counter Terrorism,
META (June 15, 2017), https://about.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/.
104 See id. There is debate as to how terrorist content should be treated. For example,
removing and immediately deleting content may pose an investigative problem, specifically
making it difficult for law enforcement to track a suspect and collect evidence for a
subsequent trial. Conversely, simply censoring material or individuals frequently leads the
content to appear elsewhere, under different profiles. See Social Media Platforms Remove
War Crimes Evidence, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 10, 2020, 1:00 AM), https://www.
hrw.org/news/2020/09/10/social-media-platforms-remove-war-crimes-evidence#; Saltman,
supra note 53.
105 See Allen, supra note 38.
106 The Dangerous Speech Project works to identify harmful speech on social media and
mitigate its impact, without promoting or encouraging censorship. Cathy Buerger & Lucas
Wright, Counterspeech: A Literature Review, DANGEROUS SPEECH PROJECT 1, 9 (Nov. 2019),
https://dangerousspeech.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Counterspeech-lit-review_comple
te-11.20.19-2.pdf.
107 Id. at 1–2.
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Counterspeech tends to be a more public, albeit specialized,
approach involving targeted responses towards certain content or
a particular group. For example, in 2014, a German counterspeech
organization amassed 100,000 counter-speakers to “like” and
comment positive messages on various neo-Nazi Facebook
pages.108 Consequently, the hateful content was buried by
messages of positivity and tolerance. Similarly, the Swedish
Facebook group, Jagärhär (“I am here”), directs its members to
post and like positive comments on specific news articles receiving
hateful comments.109 By increasing the traffic to positive
comments, Facebook’s algorithm places a greater emphasis on the
counterspeech, deeming them “top comments” and consequently
burying the negative speech.110
Counterspeech exists across many social media platforms,
though some platforms have placed a greater emphasis on its
use.111 For example, Facebook adopted counterspeech as a
platform tool to counter terrorist content.112 Facebook’s organized
initiative offers different methods of engagement across multiple
fields and disciplines.113 According to Dr. Saltman, Facebook
combines “large groups of civil society voices” with artists, poets,
and comedians to produce counter-propaganda aimed at a specific
demographic or region of the world.114 For example, Facebook may
strategically disseminate a satirical video “making fun of
Islamophobia” to a targeted population of teenagers interested in
white power music.115 Views of that video would be subsequently
tracked to measure engagement, in an attempt to detract

108 Deepa Seetharaman & Natalie Andrews, Facebook Adds New Tool to Fight Terror:
Counter Speech, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2016, 1:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BLDGB-44855.
109 Exploring Efforts to Reduce Online Hate at RightsCon 2019, DANGEROUS SPEECH
PROJECT (June 18, 2019), https://dangerousspeech.org/exploring-efforts-to-reduce-onlinehate-at-rightscon-2019/.
110 Id.
111 See Binny Matthew et al., Analyzing the Hate and Counter Speech Accounts on
Twitter (2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1812.02712.pdf; Seetharaman & Andrews, supra note
108 (noting that Facebook has recognized Counterspeech as a counterterrorism tool on their
site, whereas platforms like Twitter have independent, “unaffiliated” counterspeech
accounts).
112 See Seetharaman & Andrews, supra note 108.
113 See Counterspeech, FACEBOOK, https://counterspeech.fb.com/en/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2021).
114 Saltman, supra note 53.
115 Id.
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viewership from terrorist content.116 Similarly, the Redirect
Method on YouTube counters extremist videos by offering
conflicting advertisements, such as religious leaders denouncing
extremism or ISIS defectors exposing the hypocrisy of the
organization.117
In addition to the distribution of targeted material, platforms
have started programs that directly engage with users suspected
of showing an interest in extremism. For instance, Facebook
began a “one-to-one” program.118 Through this program, former
members of terrorist and extremist organizations directly message
Facebook users who show signs of interest in certain ideologies or
organizations to discuss the realities of joining such
organizations.119 As of June 2016, 60% of users contacted through
the program responded, and 60% of those who responded
maintained engagement with their “one-to-one” contact.120
According to Facebook’s Chief Operating Officer, Sheryl Sandberg,
counterspeech, perpetuated by former recruits to ISIS who left the
organization and returned “to tell the truth,” is “by far the best
answer” to combat terrorist content.121
Despite the widespread implementation of counterspeech
initiatives, their effectiveness is still debated. For example, a 2016
study conducted by Carla Schieb and Mike Preuss of the
University of Münster concluded that counterspeech could
effectively reach an original speaker, but the level of success
depended on the “size of the group of hateful speakers.”122
Specifically, counterspeech activity produced greater success
where the counter-speakers outnumbered the group of “hateful
speakers.”123 Conversely, a 2018 study conducted by Jozef
Miškolci regarding hate speech against the Roma in Slovakia
116 See id. (explaining how social media platforms measure the success of such
initiatives).
117 See THE REDIRECT METHOD, https://moonshotteam.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/
12/redirectmethod-fullmethod-PDF.pdf.
118 See Saltman, supra note 53.
119 See id. (noting that many former members try to dissuade engagement with
organizations based on the façade of inclusion, which does not actually exist).
120 Id.
121 World Economic Forum, The Transformation of Tomorrow, YOUTUBE (Jan. 20,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mtXfzd53wRQ (explaining Facebook’s program
during a panel at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, which was meeting to
discuss the future of technology).
122 Buerger & Wright, supra note 106, at 1.
123 See id.
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found that direct counterspeech was ineffective in altering the
original speaker’s behavior but instead was effective in reaching a
larger audience who could also engage in counterspeech.124
Accordingly, the success of counterspeech is “[r]ight now an
assumption [that] better ideas ultimately defeat worse ideas.”125
Social media sites have implemented their regulatory methods
through the use of AI and human expertise. While they have
proven successful in identifying some terrorist posts,126 there is
still a need for improvement to stay ahead of such content.
Terrorism remains a growing threat on social media, and in many
cases, terrorist content remains unchecked.127 Such situations
where content is not removed, and a terrorist attack occurs as a
result signal the need for stronger legal accountability.
iv. Identifying and Labeling Terrorism Remains a
Challenge
Because terrorism is hard to define, it can be difficult to
moderate on social media platforms. Before removing or
regulating terrorist content, it must be identified, and where it is
difficult to define, it is more difficult to regulate.128
1. Terrorism has Multiple Definitions
“There is no single, universally-accepted, definition of
terrorism.”129 Therefore, while definitions may share common
124 See id. at 2.
125 See Seetharaman & Andrews, supra note 108.
126 See Bickert & Fishman, supra note 29 (“In Q2 2018, we took action on 9.4 million

pieces of content related to ISIS, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates, the majority of which was
old material surfaced using specialized techniques. In Q3 2018, overall takedowns of
terrorist content declined to 3 million, of which 800,000 pieces of content were old, because
our efforts to surface and remove old content on the platform in the second quarter had
proven effective.”).
127 See Frenkel, supra note 9.
128 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. FBI, TERRORISM 2002-2005, i, iv, https://www.fbi.gov/statsservices/publications/terrorism-2002-2005 (recognizing the different forms of terrorism and
how the criteria do not easily define acts of terrorism).
129 Id.
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elements, no two are truly identical.130 This underscores a
common theme of this note—the inconsistency of important legal
definitions. The Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as
“the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property
to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or
any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives.”131 Section 2331 of Title 18 of the United States Code
provides two definitions of terrorism: one for international
terrorism and a separate definition for domestic terrorism. The
statute defines “international terrorism” as activities that,
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws
of the United States or of any State, or that would
be a criminal violation if committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by

130 See Wesley S. McCann & Nicholas Pimley, Mixed Mandates: Issues Concerning
Organizational and Statutory Definitions of Terrorism in the United States, 32 TERRORISM
& POL. VIOLENCE (2020), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2017.
1404457?scroll=top&needAccess=true (“Research has shown that developing a single
definition of terrorism is not only unlikely[] but also quite difficult. Definitions of terrorism
can arguably be influenced by cultural, social, and political factors.”); Boaz Ganor, Defining
Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?, 3 POLICE PRAC. & RES.
(2002),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1561426022000032060
(“Most
researchers tend to believe that an objective and internationally accepted definition of
terrorism can never be agreed upon; after all, they say, ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s
freedom fighter.’”).
131 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (1969).
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which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the
locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek
asylum . . . .132
The statute defines “domestic terrorism” as activities that,
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States
or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States . . . .133
These two definitions provide a basis for recognizing both
international and domestic terrorism. Accordingly, these
definitions will guide further discussion on defining and
identifying terrorism.
2. Designating Terrorist Organizations Provides a
Starting Point for Identification
Designating terrorist organizations is critical to ensure
continuous monitoring.
In the social media context, the
designation provides a foundation for platforms to easily identify
and remove content. Namely, if an individual has ties to a
particular designated organization, their profiles will be removed
regardless of the content that they are posting.134 Accordingly, the

132 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1).
133 § 2331(5).
134 See generally COMBATING HATE AND EXTREMISM, supra note 77 (stating Facebook’s

policy on content removal); DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 74.
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designation process and implications are important for
understanding how social media content is monitored.
Based on prior threats and attacks, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) currently lists approximately seventy
organizations as “designated foreign terrorist organizations.”135
These organizations include Hamas, Hizballah, al-Qaeda, alShabaab, Boko Haram, and ISIS.136 Organizations are designated
by the Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) in the State Department,
which examines the actual attacks executed by a foreign terrorist
organization (FTO), evidence of any planned attacks, and whether
the organization has the capability and true intent to execute any
future attacks.137 Once the CT determines that a group has met
the statutory requirements of an FTO, a record is submitted to the
Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Secretary of the
Treasury for review.138 Upon approval, the record is then
transferred to Congress, which has seven days to block the
designation.139 If Congress fails to block the designation, a notice
of designation is published in the Federal Register and the
designation is implemented.140
The designation as a terrorist organization has legal
implications for both members of an organization and unaffiliated
individuals. For example, non-citizen members of designated
FTOs are “inadmissible” into the United States.141 As for
unaffiliated persons, it is illegal to “knowingly provide ‘material
support or resources’” to designated FTOs, known as aiding and
abetting the cause.142 The latter reflects a common argument that
135 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF ST.,
https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2022).
136 See id.
137 See id. (“The Bureau of Counterterrorism in the State Department (CT) continually
monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential
targets for designation.”).
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 See id. (“Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period and in the absence of
Congressional action to block the designation, notice of the designation is published in the
Federal Register, at which point the designation takes effect.”).
141 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B); see, e.g., Luke Denne, American-born ISIS Bride not a
Citizen, Judge Rules, NBC NEWS, (Nov. 15, 2019, 10:26 AM) https://www.nbc
news.com/news/world/american-born-isis-bride-not-citizen-judge-rules-n1082766 (stating
that ISIS bride Hoda Muthana would not be allowed to enter the country after fleeing to
Syria and marrying three ISIS fighters).
142 See U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 135 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339A); 18 U.S.C. §
2339A (defining the term “material support or resources”).
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individuals make for holding social media companies liable for
terrorist content: social media platforms are a resource for
committing terrorist attacks by indirectly providing a platform for
recruitment and communication.143 This argument has been
unsuccessful144 and illustrates one of many failed attempts to hold
social media platforms liable for the dissemination of terrorist
content.
3. The Challenge and Hesitation in Labeling Domestic
Terrorism
In addition to international terrorist threats, the United States
is also subject to domestic terrorist threats. Despite a legal
recognition of domestic terrorism in the United States, there is a
lack of public information regarding domestic terrorism.145
Currently, no law exists that focuses on regulating and preventing
the threat of domestic terrorism, though Congress has made
attempts at legislation in previous sessions.146 Additionally,
unlike the designation process of FTOs, there are currently no
designated domestic terrorism organizations.147 This makes it
difficult to identify domestic threats, as there may not be “obvious”
signs that an individual is working on behalf of a terrorist
organization.148 Experts calculate that domestic terrorism

143 See generally, Pennie v. Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874, 876–77 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(explaining that the Plaintiffs could not prove the direct connection between Hamas and
the suspect, let alone between Twitter and the suspect).
144 See id. at 879–882 (referencing cases where this argument was similarly found
unsuccessful).
145 See Kornfield, supra note 20 (“The FBI, which is investigating the violence, declined
to comment when asked if the raid was considered domestic terrorism.”).
146 See, e.g., Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2020, H.R. 5602, 116th Cong. (2nd
Sess. 2020). H.R. 5602 advocated for greater access to information on domestic terrorism
by DHS, DOJ, and FBI. Furthermore, the bill established a task force to examine all
domestic threats, including white supremacy and neo-Nazism. The bill passed the House
on September 21, 2020, but remained in committee in the Senate for the duration of the
116th Congress. Id.
147 See Confronting the Rise of Domestic Terrorism in the Homeland: Hearing Before
the Comm. on Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. 43 (2019) (statement of Michael McGarrity,
Assistant Director for the Counterterrorism Div., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t
of Just.).
148 See id. (explaining that when terrorist groups are “actually designated” as such, it
is easier to identify potential terrorists).
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accounts for twenty percent of threats.149 However, many of these
threats appear to remain in a largely undefined “gray area.”
DHS recognizes categories of domestic terrorism, characterized
as Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVE) and Domestic Violent
Extremists (DVE).150 DHS defines an HVE as,
[A] person of any citizenship who has lived . . . in the
United States . . . [and] who is engaged in, or is
preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated
terrorist activities . . . in furtherance of political or
social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist
organization (FTO), but is acting independently of
direction by an FTO.151
DHS further notes that “HVEs are distinct from traditional
domestic terrorists who engage in unlawful acts of violence to
intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic
policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor.”152
HVEs are largely referred to as “lone-wolf” terrorists.153
A DVE, though similar to an HVE, is defined as “[a]n individual
based and operating primarily within the United States . . .
without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group . . .
who seeks to further political or social goals . . . through unlawful
acts of force or violence.”154 According to DHS, DVEs encompass
White Supremacist Extremists (WSE), who are defined as “racially
and ethnically motivated violent extremists.”155 DHS further
narrows the definition, stating that “[t]he mere advocacy of
149 See Seth G. Jones et al., The War Comes Home: The Evolution of Domestic Terrorism
in the United States, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Oct. 2020), https://csis-websiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/201021_Jones_War_Comes_Home_v2.pdf.
150 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., HOMELAND THREAT ASSESSMENT: OCTOBER
2020 17 (2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2020_10_06_homelandthreat-assessment.pdf. The FBI also uses these definitions. FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC TERRORISM: DEFINITIONS, TERMINOLOGY, AND METHODOLOGY 2
(2020), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-definitions-terminol
ogy-methodology.pdf/view.
151 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 150, at 17 n.7.
152 See id.
153 See Mark Hamm, Lone Wolf Terrorism in America, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: OFF. OF
JUST. PROGRAMS (Feb. 2013), https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/lone-wolfterrorism-america (“‘Lone-wolf’ terrorism is the term used to describe someone who acts
alone in a terrorist attack without the help or encouragement of a government or a terrorist
organization.”).
154 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 150, at 17 n.6.
155 See id. at 18.
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political or social positions, political activism, use of strong
rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may
not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally
protected.”156 Hence, designating an individual as a DVE is highly
context-dependent, which may result in hesitation to do so at all.
As noted in the DVE definition, an individual may post content
considered to be offensive or to reference violence; however, that
person still may not be deemed a DVE.157 This caveat underscores
the hesitation in identifying domestic terrorism: monitoring
content that may pose a threat158 must be balanced against an
individual’s right to post their opinions and invite conversation.159
Additionally, domestic terrorism is often more difficult to identify
logistically due to its overlap with international terrorism.160
Accordingly, the challenge in defining domestic terrorist
organizations makes it more difficult for platforms to remove
terrorist speech based on group identification or association.

156 See id. at 17 n.6.
157 See id.
158 To prosecute a suspect for incitement of violence, including terrorism, the

prosecution must show that the individual intended to incite or produce an unlawful action
and the likelihood that the speech would incite imminent unlawful action. Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969). Accordingly, without knowing whether the user intends
to execute an attack or intends violence from an otherwise vague post, a social media
platform may leave the post up to avoid censorship. See id.; U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME,
THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES 39 (2012), https://www.unodc.org/
documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf.
159 Offensive language, or hate speech, is treated differently than terrorist content. For
example, on Facebook, language that attacks a person or group of people based on a
characteristic such as a nationality, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation is not
permitted. Yet, discussion about excluding or segregating a certain group may be allowed
in a political context. For example, posting “I don’t want more immigrants” would be
allowed to enable users to have a discussion about immigration. However, making a violent
threat such as “[b]urn the immigrants” would be removed. See Simon, supra note 88; Hate
Speech, META, https://transparency.fb.com/policies/community-standards/hate-speech/
(last visited Jan. 21, 2022) (explaining that Facebook does not allow hate speech, defined
as “direct attack[s] against people . . . on the basis of . . . race, ethnicity, national origin,
disability, religious affiliation, caste, sexual orientation, sex, gender identity and serious
disease.”).
160 This is particularly true for lone-wolf terrorism, where an individual may be a
United States citizen, but becomes influenced or radicalized by international organizations.
See Gregory D. Miller, Blurred Lines: The New “Domestic” Terrorism, 13 PERSP. ON
TERRORISM 63 (June 2019) (stating that different elements are at play for recruiting and
executing attacks, which may blur the lines between domestic and international terrorism).
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C. Section 230 and the Anti-Terrorism Act Impact Decisions
Regarding Social Media Terrorism
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and the AntiTerrorism Act serve as two primary legal authorities regarding
terrorism on social media. Section 230 provides immunity to
network operators, absolving social media sites of liability for
content published by third-party users.161 The Anti-Terrorism Act,
on the other hand, provides civil remedies for victims of
international terrorist attacks.162
i. Section 230 Provides Broad Immunity to Network
Operators
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act serves as a
primary guide in Internet liability cases and has elicited
controversy and debate since its enactment on February 8,
1996.163 The Communications Decency Act was originally
proposed in 1995 by Senator James Exon (D-NE).164 The bill’s
original purpose was to implement a punitive system for network
operators who knowingly made “indecent material” available to
minors.165 The proposed bill was met with opposition, as
individuals believed that it would lead to mass censorship (a

161 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”).
162 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (“Any national of the United States injured . . . by reason of
an act of international terrorism . . . may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of
the United States and shall recover . . . damages . . . .”).
163 Felix Gillette, Section 230 Was Supposed to Make the Internet a Better Place. It
Failed, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/features/2019-08-07/section-230-was-supposed-to-make-the-internet-a-better-placeit-failed (stating that conservatives tend to view section 230 as a tool for censorship, where
liberals view section 230 as an “excuse” to ignore harmful content).
164 S. 314, 104th Cong. (1995).
165
Id. at § 4 (“Amends the Federal criminal code to: (1) increase the fine for
broadcasting obscene, indecent, or profane language over the radio . . . .”).
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familiar argument today).166 Yet despite the opposition, Senator
Exon’s proposal passed the Senate by a vote of 86-14.167
Concurrently, in 1995, the Supreme Court of New York decided
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy.168 Prodigy, a computer network
operator, had published defamatory content about the plaintiff,
Stratton Oakmont.169 Stratton Oakmont sued, alleging that
Prodigy was liable for the defamatory posts.170 In its defense,
Prodigy relied on Cubby v. CompuServe.171 In Cubby, the network
CompuServe published libelous content about Cubby, an
electronic newsletter.172 In that case, the Southern District of New
York applied a standard that is protective of speakers, which in
this case was network operator:
A computerized database is the functional
equivalent of a more traditional news vendor, and
the inconsistent application of a lower standard of
liability to an electronic news distributor such as
CompuServe than that which is applied to a public
library, book store, or newsstand would impose an
undue burden on the free flow of information. Given
the relevant First Amendment considerations, the
appropriate standard of liability to be applied to
166 See Gillette, supra note 163 (“Back in 1995, when the CDA was conceived, section
230 enjoyed bipartisan support from members of Congress, who believed that tech
companies would do a better job at moderating the internet than federal regulators. But a
growing number of hostile lawmakers are now criticizing Big Tech’s safe harbor.”). On May
28, 2020, President Donald Trump issued his “Executive Order on Preventing Online
Censorship.” Preventing Online Censorship, Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 FR 34079 (2020).
This Executive Order accused Internet platforms like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and
YouTube of “engaging in selective censorship that is harming our national discourse.” Id.
Specifically, the President claimed that networks flagged content that did not violate their
standards, deleted accounts “with no warning, no rationale, and no recourse,” and placed
labels on posts reflecting political bias. Id. President Trump cited section 230 as a cause,
stating that its scope should be narrowed. To redefine the scope of section 230, the President
proposed enacting notice requirements, clarifying exceptions where a publisher could be
held liable, and enacting a “good faith” measure when removing content. This is one
example of how politics can influence the application of the law. See id.
167 See Gillette, supra note 163.
168 See id.; Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 24, 1995).
169 See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *2 (stating that Prodigy was a publisher
in large that “held itself out as an online service that exercised editorial control over the
content of messages posted on its computer bulletin boards,” where the libelous statements
were posted).
170 Id. at *1.
171 Id. at *3–4.
172 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137–38 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

5 - SCHANTZ MACORS (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

9/18/2022 8:22 PM

PREVENTING SOCIAL MEDIA-BASED TERRORISM

181

CompuServe is whether it knew or had reason to
know of the allegedly defamatory . . . statements.173
Accordingly, the court found that CompuServe was not liable for
the defamatory posts.174 Yet, in Stratton Oakmont, the court
distinguished the two cases because, unlike CompuServe, Prodigy
screened its content before publication.175 Therefore, the court
found Prodigy liable based upon the distinction between a
distributor, like CompuServe, and a publisher, such as Prodigy,
that reviewed its posts.176
This decision led to a call for greater protection of network
operators because network operators could now be held liable for
defamatory content on their sites that they were not even aware
of.177 Subsequently, Representative Ron Wyden (D-OR) and
Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA) proposed the “Internet
Freedom and Family Empowerment Act.”178 According to the bill,
a computer service operator would not be treated as the publisher
of any content posted on its site.179 Additionally, under the bill’s
Good Samaritan provision, network operators would not be held
liable for removing suspect content.180 The “Internet Freedom and
Family Empowerment Act” was combined with the
Communications Decency Act and section 230 to make up Title V
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.181 The package, including
173 See id. at 140–41.
174 See id. at 141. (“Because CompuServe, as a news distributor, may not be held liable

if it neither knew nor had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville
statements, summary judgment in favor of CompuServe on the libel claim is granted.”).
175 See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4–5 (“The key distinction between
CompuServe and Prodigy is [twofold.] First, Prodigy held itself out to the public and its
members as controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards. Second, Prodigy
implemented this control through its automatic software screening program, and the
Guidelines which Board Leaders are required to enforce.”).
176 See id. (finding that “Prodigy is a publisher rather than a distributor” because it
used “technology and manpower to delete notes from its computer bulletin boards on the
basis of offensiveness and ‘bad taste,’” which constitutes editorial control).
177 See Gillette, supra note 163 (explaining that after the Stratton Oakmont decision
“[a] spasm of anxiety coursed through the web,” since the court in Stratton Oakmont held
that carriers who use “screening software to filter out offensive language and moderators
to enforce guidelines,” could be “held liable for the defamatory language of its users”).
178 H.R. 1978, 104th Cong. (1995).
179 Id. § 230(c) (“No provider or user of interactive computer services shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by an information content
provider.”).
180 Id.
181 See Sara L. Zeigler, Communications Decency Act of 1996 (1996), THE FIRST AMEND.
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1070/communicationsdecency-act-of-1996 (“Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act (CDA) as Title V
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section 230, was signed into law by President Clinton on February
8, 1996.182
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act begins by
highlighting a series of “findings,” which contributed to its
enactment.183 Specifically, subsection (a) discusses the rapid
growth of the Internet, as well as Americans’ reliance on online
platforms.184 Subsection (a)(4) additionally notes that “[t]he
Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished,
to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government
regulation.”185 Subsection (b) sets forth a “policy” that states that
the country will continue to encourage the development of the
Internet while ensuring Internet safety.186 However, the key
component of the legislation is found in subsection (c). Deemed
“the law that matters most for speech on the web,”187 subsection
(c)(1) asserts that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.”188
Subsection (c) also contains a Good Samaritan provision:
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that
the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available
to information content providers or others the

of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.”); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
182 Gillette, supra note 163.
183 47 U.S.C. § 230(a).
184 § 230(a).
185 § 230(a)(4).
186 § 230(b).
187 Subsection (c) establishes immunity for network operators, including social media
sites. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1604 (2018).
188 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
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technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).189
Since its enactment, the scope of the Communications Decency
Act has been narrowed. In the 1997 case Reno v. ACLU, one year
after the Communications Decency Act and Section 230 were
enacted, the Supreme Court held that the Communications
Decency Act “place[d] an unacceptably heavy burden on protected
speech.”190 Specifically, the Court noted that the Communications
Decency Act’s ban on “indecent” content was too broad and would
have a “chilling” effect on Internet speech.191 So long as the
content was not obscene, such as content depicting child
pornography, it may be considered protected speech and hence
could not be prohibited under the Communications Decency Act.192
The Court’s decision resulted in much of the Communications
Decency Act’s indecency content getting struck down,193 resulting
in a narrower application of the Communications Decency Act.
However, during that same year, the Fourth Circuit applied a
broad interpretation of the Communications Decency Act and
section 230 protection for providers. In Zeran v. American Online,
Inc., the plaintiff, Zeran, argued that AOL should have been liable
for defamatory content posted on one of its forums by a third-party
user.194 Specifically, Zeran argued that AOL was aware of the
defamatory content after he requested its removal and that AOL
was a distributor and was consequently not protected under
section 230.195 However, the court ruled in favor of AOL because
it would be “impossible” to screen millions of posts for problematic
content.196 This decision signaled that section 230 encourages a
strong application in favor of network operators.197
189
190
191
192
193

Id.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997).
Id. at 871–72.
See id. at 874, 883.
See Klonick, supra note 187, at 1605; Reno, 521 U.S. at 885 (holding that antiindecency provisions restricted speech too much, due to the vagueness of what was
considered acceptable or permissible content).
194 See Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
195 See id. at 331.
196 See id.
197 Courts have continued to apply section 230 broadly, protecting social media
companies from liability for third-party content. See Universal Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Lycos,
Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 415 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that Lycos’ status as an online message
board “f[ell] squarely” within the immunized group protected by section 230); Nemet
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More recently, the Supreme Court declined to hear a section 230
case, Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group USA, LLC.198
In his statement explaining the denial of certiorari, Justice
Thomas stated that “[p]aring back the sweeping immunity courts
have read into section 230 would not necessarily render
defendants liable for online misconduct. It simply would give
plaintiffs a chance to raise their claims in the first place.”199 He
further stated that although the Court did not hear this particular
case, it would reserve the right to hear a section 230 claim in an
“appropriate case.”200
As the main statute applied in Internet liability cases, section
230 serves as one hurdle for victims of terrorist attacks and their
families to bring successful claims against social media platforms.
The very purpose of section 230 is to protect network providers, in
this case, social media networks, from liability for third-party user
content, as it is difficult to monitor every single social media
post.201 Although there are benefits of this protection,202 section
230 should be amended to roll back immunity or implement a
carve-out for terrorist content where it is clear that social media
played a role in the facilitation of a terrorist attack. By modifying
the scope of protection, social media companies will be held liable
for this harmful content.

Chevrolet, LTD. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 260 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding
that section 230 applied to a consumer review website).
198 The Court did not provide a reason as to why the case would not be heard.
Malwarebytes was an antitrust case involving software developers. Malwarebytes, Inc. v.
Enigma Software Group, No. 19-1284 (2020). At issue was “whether federal courts can
derive an implied exception to Section 230(c)(2)(B) immunity for blocking or filtering
decisions when they are alleged to be ‘driven by anticompetitive animus.’” Id.
199 Id. at 9.
200 Id. at 10.
201 47 U.S.C. § 230.
202 See Jason Kelley, Section 230 is Good, Actually, EFF (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/12/section-230-good-actually (stating that section 230
protects Big Tech and users, alike, by ensuring that social media companies are not held
liable for all posts and users have the ability to post freely).
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ii. The Anti-Terrorism Act Provides Civil Remedies for
Victims of International Terrorism
The Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, was first enacted in
1990.203 The Act established “a new civil cause of action in Federal
law for international terrorism that provide[d] extraterritorial
jurisdiction over terrorist acts abroad against United States
nationals.”204 The Anti-Terrorism Act was proposed in response to
two international terrorist attacks against American citizens: the
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and the murder of American citizen
Leon Klinghoffer.205
On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 departed London
Heathrow Airport for New York City.206 One hundred ninety
Americans were on board the flight.207 Less than forty minutes
after departure, the plane exploded 30,000 feet above Lockerbie,
Scotland, killing everyone on board and eleven people on the
ground.208 The FBI, in conjunction with international law
enforcement from Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Great
Britain, discovered that a bomb had been placed inside a radio in
a piece of luggage that was detonated during the flight.209 In
November 1991, the United States and Scotland indicted two
Libyan intelligence operatives for planting the bomb.210 On
January 31, 2001, Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi was found guilty
of the attack.211 Additionally, the Libyan government accepted
responsibility for the attack and agreed to pay the victims’ families
approximately three billion dollars.212
On October 7, 1985, three years before the Pan Am attack, four
members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) hijacked an
203
204
205
206

S. 2465, 101st Cong. (1990).
Id.
102 CONG. REC. S4511 (1991).
Pan Am 103 Bombing, FBI.GOV, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/pan-am103-bombing (last visited Jan. 15, 2022).
207 Id. (“Among the 259 passengers and crew were 190 Americans.”).
208 Id.
209 See id. (explaining that after investigating 845 square miles of Scotland and
interviewing more than 10,000 individuals, law enforcement was able to piece together the
tools used in the terrorist attack).
210 Id.
211 Id. (explaining that al-Megrahi was convicted but his co-defendant was found not
guilty and released).
212 Id.
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Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, and took 400 passengers
hostage.213 American and British passengers were separated from
the rest of the ship and told that they would be killed if they did
not comply with the hijackers’ demands.214 Upon approaching
Damascus, the hijackers demanded to be connected to American
and Italian authorities to negotiate the release of fifty prisoners
being held in a prison in Israel.215 When their demands were not
met, the hijackers separated sixty-nine-year-old American citizen,
Leon Klinghoffer, from his wife and the rest of the group.216
Through eyewitness reports and radio transmissions from the
hijackers to a Lebanese radio station, authorities discovered that
the hijackers had shot and killed Mr. Klinghoffer.217 The hijacking
lasted two days and concluded when the secretary-general of the
PLF, Mohammed Abbas Zaidan, urged the hijackers to surrender
in exchange for safe passage out of Egypt.218 The hijackers
complied and were transported off the ship.219
In 1991, Ilsa and Lisa Klinghoffer, Leon Klinghoffer’s
daughters, filed a lawsuit against the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) for the death of their father.220 The AntiTerrorism Act was applied in that case, providing American
jurisdiction over the PLO.221 However, nearly five months after its
enactment, the Anti-Terrorism Act was repealed due to a technical

213 Jennifer Latson, A Murder That Shocked the World, at Sea and on Stage, TIME
(Oct. 7, 2015, 10:30 AM), https://time.com/4055773/achille-lauro/ (discussing the significant
impacts of this attack); William E. Smith, Terrorism: The Voyage of the Achille Lauro, TIME
(Oct. 21, 1985), http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,960163-1,00.html
(according to the Italian News Agency, ANSA, the men had intended to quietly board the
ship at Genoa and launch a terrorist attack at the Ashdod port but their plan drastically
changed after waiters on board the ship saw the men cleaning their guns).
214 See Smith, supra note 213.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. (“Shortly before dusk Wednesday, the four gunmen came ashore aboard a squat,
battered tugboat of the Suez Canal Authority. Then they disappeared, not to resurface until
they landed in Sicily some 30 hours later.”).
220 See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 44 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
the PLO was not “immune from suit,” despite claims that the United States lacked
jurisdiction over the matter); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 854
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1990).
221 See Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 865 (citing United States v. Palestine Liberation Org.,
695 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (concluding that the ATA granted jurisdiction over
the PLO)).
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error.222 Due to its significant role in impending litigation, as well
as the unanimous support provided during the first enactment, the
Anti-Terrorism Act was reintroduced and passed again in 1991.223
The Anti-Terrorism Act provides civil remedies for “[a]ny
national of the United States injured . . . by reason of an act of
international terrorism.”224 Specifically, section (a) of the AntiTerrorism Act states that,
Any national of the United States injured in his or
her person, property, or business by reason of an act
of international terrorism, or his or her estate,
survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any
appropriate district court of the United States and
shall recover threefold the damages he or she
sustains and the cost of the suit, including
attorney’s fees.225
In 2016, the Anti-Terrorism Act was expanded through the Justice
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA).226 JASTA expanded
the scope of potential claims by adding civil liability for individuals
or organizations accused of aiding and abetting terrorist
organizations.227 As stated by Senator Chuck Grassley, the
original sponsor of the Anti-Terrorism Act, “[t]he ATA removes the
jurisdictional hurdles in the courts confronting victims and it
empowers victims with all the weapons available in civil
litigation.”228
The Anti-Terrorism Act has since been applied in multiple cases
involving terrorism and banking institutions.229 However, in the
222 See 102 CONG. REC. S4,511 (1991) (“Due to an enrolling error, the ATA was enacted
into law on November 5, 1990[,] as part of the Military Construction Appropriations Act—
Public Law 101-519. . . . Unfortunately, this law was repealed just a few weeks after oral
argument; albeit, on purely technical grounds.”).
223 See id. (“The ATA garnered strong bipartisan support in both the House and
Senate. . . . [T]he Senate unanimously supports the ATA.”).
224 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).
225 Id.
226 See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Const. & Civ. Just. Of the Comm. On the Judiciary H.R., 114th Cong. 114-87 (2016)
(“JASTA amends the Antiterrorism Act to clarify that those who aid, abet, or conspire with
a foreign terrorist organization are subject to civil liability.”).
227 See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 2(b)
(2016).
228 102 CONG. REC. S4511 (1991).
229 See, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1393–394 (2018) (“It is assumed
here that those individuals who inflicted death or injury by terrorism committed crimes in
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field of terrorism and social media, Anti-Terrorism Act claims have
been largely unsuccessful.230 Currently, the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits have dismissed Anti-Terrorism Act social media
claims.231 However, many similar cases of this nature are to be
expected, which may ultimately lead to new case law.232
Thus far, two district courts have ruled in Anti-Terrorism Act
social media cases.233 Pennie v. Twitter, a 2017 case from
California, was one of the first cases to apply the Anti-Terrorism
Act in the context of social media terrorism.234 On July 7, 2016,
Hamas sympathizer Micah Johnson murdered five police officers
in Dallas, Texas.235 The victims’ families and fellow police officers
sued Twitter, Google, and Facebook, alleging that the platforms
aided and abetted the attack, thus violating the Anti-Terrorism
Act, by maintaining Hamas social media profiles.236 The court
dismissed the claims, alleging that the Plaintiffs failed to establish
proximate cause under the Anti-Terrorism Act.237 Even though
Johnson had “liked” several extremist pages, the Plaintiffs could
not prove that Hamas had directly contacted Johnson or that he
viewed any of their content.238 Likewise, in the 2018 case
Taamneh v. Twitter, the court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ AntiTerrorism Act claim regarding an ISIS terrorist attack in an
violation of well-settled, fundamental precepts of international law, precepts essential for
basic human rights protections. It is assumed as well that individuals who knowingly and
purposefully facilitated banking transactions to aid, enable, or facilitate the
terrorist acts would themselves be committing crimes under the same international-law
prohibitions.”). This note does not discuss the ATA in connection with financial institutions.
230 See Y. Peter Kang, 6th Circ. Ruling Raises Bar For Social Media Terrorism Suits,
LAW 360 (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1151658/6th-circ-ruling-raisesbar-for-social-media-terrorism-suits (“[The Anti-Terrorism Act] makes it very hard for
plaintiffs to come up with facts to get around the rulings. The writing is on the wall that
[these suits] have a very low chance of success.”).
231 See id. (“The Sixth Circuit’s published opinion cites the Ninth Circuit’s January
2018 precedential ruling in Fields v. Twitter Inc., which held that the social media company
couldn’t be held liable for a 2015 Islamic State attack in Jordan that killed two government
contractors.”); Crosby v. Twitter Inc., 921 F.3d 617, 628 (6th Cir. 2019) (dismissing claims
for failure to show proximate cause); Fields v. Twitter Inc., 881 F.3d 739, 741 (9th Cir. 2018)
(dismissing claims for failure to show proximate cause).
232 See Kang, supra note 230, at 2 (explaining that as terrorism continues to maintain
a presence on social media, scholars predict that parties will continue to utilize the ATA as
a possible route for civil remedies).
233 See generally Pennie v. Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Taamneh
v. Twitter, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 904, 907 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
234 See Pennie, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 877.
235 See id. at 876–77.
236 See id. at 877.
237 See id. at 886.
238 See id. at 888.
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Istanbul nightclub.239 The court in Taamneh similarly dismissed
the claim for failing to establish the proximate cause element.240
The court also dismissed the claim because the plaintiffs failed to
prove that the defendants committed an “act of international
terrorism,” pursuant to the statute.241
This rationale for dismissal was further affirmed in two
separate cases, which reached the Ninth and Sixth Circuits,
respectively. In the 2018 case Fields v. Twitter, family members
of deceased government contractors murdered by a Jordanian
police officer who had pledged allegiance to ISIS sued Twitter for
enabling the distribution of propaganda and facilitating direct
messaging between the police officer and ISIS.242 The Ninth
Circuit dismissed the claim, determining that the Plaintiffs failed
to show proximate causation.243 Namely, the Plaintiffs failed to
prove that Twitter’s conduct directly caused the attack to occur.244
Likewise, in Crosby v. Twitter, the Sixth Circuit dismissed all
Anti-Terrorism Act claims regarding the Pulse Nightclub shooting
in 2016.245 The court held that the Plaintiffs failed to prove that
Twitter proximately caused the attack because extremist content
on social media does not necessarily lead to direct
radicalization.246 Furthermore, the court held that since Twitter
did not physically commit the act of terrorism, it was not liable for
the execution of the attack.247 Finally, the court emphasized that

239 See Taamneh, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 877.
240 See id. at 911 (stating that the Plaintiffs failed to show that the terrorist saw content

published by ISIS and that the Plaintiffs failed to show that the Defendants were knowingly
aiding and abetting a terrorist cause).
241 See id. (explaining that the Anti-Terrorism Act provides civil remedies for acts of
international terrorism against United States nationals, and where terrorism occurs on
United States soil or does not meet the full definition of international terrorism, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 2331, parties cannot recover on an ATA claim).
242 See generally Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 881 F.3d 739, 741 (9th Cir. 2018).
243 See id. (explaining that the Plaintiffs failed to show a direct connection between
social media consumption and the execution of a terrorist attack).
244 See id. at 748–51 (noting that although the suspect might have viewed extremist
content, the Plaintiffs could not show that the Defendants’ content served as the critical
force in his decision to execute the attack).
245 See Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 921 F.3d 617, 626 (6th Cir. 2019).
246 See id. at 624–25.
247 See id. at 627.
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the attack was not international and therefore, not subject to the
protection of the Anti-Terrorism Act.248
The Anti-Terrorism Act places burdensome restrictions on
parties seeking to bring claims against social media platforms for
their involvement in facilitating terrorism. Specifically, barring
claims of domestic terrorism arbitrarily discriminates against
victims of domestic terrorist attacks and their families; it also
forces judges to become experts in national security when
determining whether an attack constitutes international
terrorism.
Accordingly, the Anti-Terrorism Act should be
amended to expand the scope of claims that can be raised by
victims.
II. SECTION 230 AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT SHOULD BE
AMENDED TO ALLOW SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS TO BE HELD
LIABLE FOR THE PUBLICATION OF TERRORIST CONTENT
Social media terrorism is a significant problem that threatens
national security. Given the rapid evolution of terrorism, it is
critical for platforms to not only keep up with mitigating the threat
but stay ahead of it. To accomplish this important policy goal,
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and the AntiTerrorism Act should be amended to hold social media companies
liable where a failure to act results in the clear planning,
organizing, or execution of an attack.249 First, section 230 needs to
be amended to roll back the broad immunity afforded to network
operators. This amendment would implement consequences for
platforms regarding social media terrorism and enable victims to
bring lawsuits against social media companies. Second, the AntiTerrorism Act needs to be amended to include recourse for victims
of domestic terrorist attacks. By enacting these amendments,
248 See id. at 621 (noting that domestic terrorism is not recognized by the AntiTerrorism Act. Therefore, since the act occurred in Orlando by an American gunman, a
claim could not be brought under the Anti-Terrorism Act).
249 47 U.S.C. § 230. To reiterate, this standard would encourage liability in situations
where individuals or organizations openly discussed plans of violence or clearly intended to
commit an organized, harmful act. Evidence might include open communication between
an individual and an organization, unremoved posts of violence or threats, consistent or
increased engagement with organizations or ideologies, etc.
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either separately or in conjunction with one another, victims
would have greater legal recourse following an act of terrorism.
A. Section 230 Should be Amended to Remove Broad
Immunity for Network Operators, to Allow Victims of
Social Media Driven Attacks to File a Lawsuit
Since its enactment, section 230 has been scrutinized for the
“sweeping immunity”250 it provides to network operators,
especially social media sites. Accordingly, calls to amend section
230, specifically proposals to roll back the scope of immunity, are
justified because the current framework absolves social media
companies of all responsibility for social media terrorism, even
when a platform has clearly failed to investigate and remove
suspect content.
Section 230 should be amended to account for the evolving safety
and security needs of society. Section 230 was proposed in 1995
and was intended to protect individuals, namely minors, from
viewing offensive content via media outlets.251 At the time of the
proposal, social media was in its early stages and many of today’s
concerns and threats were not yet recognized. Additionally,
section 230 was enacted before September 11, 2001. While the
United States had suffered terrorist attacks before September
11,252 the threat, danger, and complexity of future attacks were
likely not yet realized.253 Accordingly, section 230 should be
amended to provide a “carve-out” for terrorism to reflect the
realistic threats seen today and further incentivize social media
250 Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group, No. 19-1284 (2020) (discussing
section 230’s broad immunity).
251 47 U.S.C. § 230.
252 By the time section 230 was proposed, the United States had experienced the 1993
World Trade Center bombing. BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, 1993 World Trade Center
Bombing, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.state.gov/1993-world-trade-centerbombing/.
253 See 9/11 Investigation, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/911investigation (last visited Jan. 23, 2022) (“They were the most lethal terrorist attacks in
history, taking the lives of 3,000 Americans and international citizens and ultimately
leading to far-reaching changes in anti-terror approaches and operations in the U.S. and
around the globe.”); Explosions at Boston Marathon, NPR, https://www.npr.org
/series/177378595/boston-marathon-explosions (last visited Jan. 23, 2022); Orlando
Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/2016-orlandoshooting.
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companies to take a stronger stance on extremist content. Unlike
previous applications where companies were shielded from
defamation lawsuits,254 social media terrorism is a matter of
national security. Therefore, protecting “Big Tech” companies
should not outweigh the importance of holding those companies
accountable for failing to act and prevent national security
disasters.
The current state of section 230 also deprives victims and their
families of the opportunity to have their day in court. As stated by
Justice Thomas, the widespread immunity offered by section 230
denies plaintiffs the chance to bring a claim against network
operators from the start, regardless of the merits of the case.255
This is unjust as victims of terrorist attacks and their families
should be able to seek legal redress if it is found that social media
played a role in the execution of an attack.256 Some may argue that
amending section 230 would not significantly impact the scope of
legal redress available because of other hurdles, such as proximate
cause. Specifically, even if an amendment narrowed immunity,
plaintiffs would still bear the burden of proving that the social
media platform directly caused the attack. While that may be
true, it should not restrict a victim or family’s ability to file a
lawsuit from the outset. For example, social media records clearly
displayed posts advocating for the Capitol insurrection, including
discussions of violence.257 Despite the overwhelming evidence on
social media that reflects many platforms’ failure to act and stop
conversations referencing violence and insurrection, a victim or
their family would not be able to sue any social media companies.
Accordingly, section 230’s broad immunity absolves network
operators of liability for the content published on their sites,
regardless of the potentially damaging effect on victims, families,
254 See Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (involving claims
of defamation and libelous content).
255 Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group, No. 19-1284, (2020); Crosby v.
Twitter Inc., 921 F.3d 617, 628 n. 7 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Even if ISIS ‘committed, planned, or
authorized’ the Pulse Night club shooting, Plaintiffs would still have to overcome 47 U.S.C.
§ 230, which provides broad immunity to ‘interactive computer services.’ This is another
substantial hurdle for Plaintiffs.”).
256 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333. This may include records of direct engagement, content posted
by the terrorists, manifestos or documents signaling an intent to act, or other clear evidence
of participation. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 135.
257 See Collins & Zadrozny, supra note 5 (discussing social media posts advocating for
the Capitol insurrection).
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and the nation. While the hope is that social media platforms will
self-regulate the content, there is no legal recourse if such
mechanisms fail. By rolling back section 230 protection and
increasing accountability of social media platforms, victims would
be given an avenue of recourse and social media companies would
be further incentivized to continuously revise and update their
policies.
The goals of this proposed rollback are to increase accountability
where social media has clearly assisted in the planning, growth,
and organization of an attack. However, calls to completely repeal
section 230 may do more harm than good. Section 230 protects
social media platforms from a flood of litigation, specifically by
preventing claims about content that is not objectively offensive or
harmful. Therefore, a balance must be struck to ensure that social
media platforms do not lose all protection, while also ensuring that
they do not receive the form of “qualified immunity” that has
existed for so long.
B. The Anti-Terrorism Act Should be Amended to Include
Instances of Domestic Terrorism, to Expand the Scope of
Claims that can be Brought Under the Anti-Terrorism Act
The Anti-Terrorism Act was enacted to provide civil remedies
for American victims of international terrorist acts by enabling
victims and their families to hold perpetrators liable for their
deadly crimes.258 Although a significant Act for victims of
terrorism, the Anti-Terrorism Act fails to account for terrorism’s
evolving nature. The Anti-Terrorism Act places burdensome
restrictions on legal claims, thereby preventing parties from
recovering from all types of terrorist attacks.259 Therefore, the
Anti-Terrorism Act should be amended to include both
258 See S. 2465, 101st Cong. (1990).
259 See id. Compiling the case law of ATA cases shows that the two largest obstacles for

plaintiffs include proving proximate cause and proving acts of international terrorism. This
note will not address proving proximate cause, as such proof would likely be difficult to
obtain because the proximate cause is measured with respect to the content’s direct impact
on the perpetrator. See Fields v. Twitter Inc., 881 F.3d 739, 741 (9th Cir. 2018). However,
amending the ATA to recognize domestic claims, in addition to international terrorism
claims, would potentially expand the scope of recovery for victims of domestic terror attacks.
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international and domestic terrorist attacks to expand the possible
scope of claims and provide legal recourse for victims of terrorist
attacks and their families. Although the Anti-Terrorism Act
would not directly impact social media companies, it would provide
an additional avenue of recovery against domestic actors who
utilized social media for the execution of an attack.
The Anti-Terrorism Act was originally enacted in 1990, before
the growth of social media and the first terrorist attacks on United
States soil.260 Similar to section 230, this is a problem because
legislators were not aware of events that would transpire in the
future, specifically the dominance of social media and the
complexity of modern terrorism.261 Almost twenty years ago, the
nation experienced “the most lethal terrorist attacks in history.”262
Critical actions were taken to combat the new world threat.263
With the threat of domestic terrorism growing and no current,
widespread legislation in place to prosecute domestic terrorists,
the Anti-Terrorism Act must be amended to proactively combat
this danger.
Domestic terrorism is a significant threat to national security.
Currently, experts believe that domestic terrorism accounts for
twenty percent of all terrorism threats.264 From 2017 to 2019, the
United States made more domestic terrorism-related arrests than
international terrorism-related arrests.265 Specifically, in 2018, all
“extremism-related murders” were committed by “right-wing
domestic terrorists.”266 Additionally, as stated by Brian Murphy,
former Principal Deputy Under Secretary for the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis in DHS, “lone actors from [domestic
terrorism] movements pose the greatest threat to the homeland
260 See S. 2465, 101st Cong. (1990); 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, supra note 252.
261 See 9/11 Investigation, supra note 253. Pre-September 11, the nation was not

completely aware of the severity of international terrorism. See id. More than thirty years
after the ATA’s enactment, the threat of international terrorism remains, in addition to the
rise of domestic terrorism. See Jones et al., supra note 149, at 1. Accordingly, the scope and
complexity of terrorism have grown exponentially. See id. at 6.
262 See 9/11 Investigation, supra note 253 (describing September 11, 2001).
263 See DHS, September 11 Chronology, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 3, 2020),
https://www.dhs.gov/september-11-chronology (discussing the actions taken after 9/11,
including the creation of DHS).
264 See Jones et al., supra note 149.
265 Confronting the Rise of Domestic Terrorism in the Homeland: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. 1–2 (2019) (statement of Hon. Bennie Thompson,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.).
266 Id.
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due to their ability, in many instances, to remain undetected by
law enforcement.”267 Although agencies have cooperated with
social media companies to track the threat of domestic terrorism,
many companies are not yet equipped to properly detect and
neutralize threats.268 Accordingly, with so much uncertainty
surrounding such a pressing threat, the Anti-Terrorism Act should
be amended to provide one option of legal recourse for domestic
terrorism victims. Although other obstacles may not guarantee
judgment in favor of a victim or their family, domestic terrorism
claims would not be “barred” outright by the Anti-Terrorism
Act.269
Enabling both international and domestic terrorism claims
would also show the legitimacy of the threat of domestic terrorism
in the United States. The current system is flawed if only victims
and families of international attacks can recover damages,
whereas those who suffered from a domestic attack, such as the
Pulse Nightclub attack, cannot.
Additionally, as openly
recognized by public officials, there is less transparency and
education regarding domestic terrorism.270 By expanding the
scope of the Anti-Terrorism Act, greater attention would be
brought to the threat of domestic terrorism and the uncertainty
surrounding it. Both international and domestic attacks are forms
of terrorism, regardless of who committed them or where they
occurred. Accordingly, by expanding the designation, victims and
their families would be afforded an improved opportunity to bring
claims against domestic terrorists.
In addition to the importance of justice for victims and their
families, an amendment to the Anti-Terrorism Act is an important
policy decision. Much of the line between international and
domestic terrorism has been “blurred.”271 When designating a
terrorist attack as international or domestic, officials will typically
267 Id. at 19–20 (statement of Brian Murphy, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for the
Off. of Intelligence and Analysis in the Dep’t of Homeland Sec.).
268 Id. at 17 (statement of Michael McGarrity, Assistant Dir. for the Counterterrorism
Div., Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Just.).
269 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (stating that recovery is available for international terrorist
attacks).
270 Confronting the Rise of Domestic Terrorism in the Homeland: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. 2 (2019) (statement of Hon. Bennie Thompson,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.).
271 See generally Gregory D. Miller, Blurred Lines: The New “Domestic” Terrorism, 13
PERSP. ON TERRORISM 63, 63 (June 2019).
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consider three factors: the nationality of the terrorist(s), the
nationality of the victim(s), and the location of the crime.272
However, it is unclear how those factors must align to determine
whether an attack is deemed international or domestic.273 In the
context of social media, there can be even greater uncertainty as
to how to classify an attack. For example, if an American citizen
becomes radicalized through social media by an influence or cause
that is “foreign” to their home, it remains a question of what
impact that would have on classification as a domestic or
international attack.274 By expanding the Anti-Terrorism Act to
account for both forms of terrorism, the courts will not set a
dangerous precedent in determining which acts constitute strictly
international terrorism and which represent solely domestic
attacks. Enabling both claims essentially makes the litigation
process easier by not having judges serve as experts on matters of
national security. Additionally, these claims advance overall
safety and security by ensuring that all terrorist attacks are
properly investigated and litigated.
In conjunction with an amendment to the Anti-Terrorism Act,
social media platforms must also work to expand and improve
their removal policies regarding domestic terrorism. In 2019,
social media companies were still working to “improve” their
regulation of domestic terrorism.275 In improving their methods
and policies, social media platforms should compile a list of suspect
organizations, as well as common hashes used by those
organizations, that suggest inciting violence or an imminent
threat of attack. This would create a uniform regulatory system
and prevent social media sites from only recognizing international
organizations or being divided on which groups are considered
domestic terrorists. Through both legislative amendments and a

272 See id. at 64 (explaining that the Oklahoma City bombing was classified as a
domestic attack because American citizen Timothy McVeigh executed an attack against
Americans in the United States, whereas 9/11 was an international attack as it was
executed by a non-citizen against Americans in the United States).
273 See id.
274 See id. at 68.
275 Confronting the Rise of Domestic Terrorism in the Homeland: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. 32 (2019) (statement of Michael McGarrity,
Assistant Dir. for the Counterterrorism Div., Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t
of Jus.).
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“boots on the ground” approach by social media companies,
internet safety would improve.
Some might argue that increased scrutiny of content to mitigate
the spread of terrorism would lead to censorship and First
Amendment violations. Although the First Amendment does not
apply to private social media sites,276 freedom of speech and
expression is a critical aspect of social media. However, social
media regulatory policies would still be in place to investigate
potential errors in removal.
Although additional legislation has been enacted to address
terrorism, the Anti-Terrorism Act has remained unchanged
regarding the scope of recovery for victims of international
terrorist attacks.277 This is a critical issue, as the sole statute for
civil redress has failed to account for the rapidly progressing
nature of terrorism. By expanding the scope of the Anti-Terrorism
Act, greater attention would likely be placed on the growing threat
of domestic terrorism, and victims of domestic terrorism and their
families would have a better opportunity for legal redress.
CONCLUSION
Terrorism is a severe threat to the United States—and its
presence is closer than most Americans suspect. If policies and
regulatory methods remain stagnant, despite advancements in
technology, terrorism will only continue to grow. However, the
regulation and prevention of terrorism can be achieved by
amending current federal legislation. Amending section 230 and

276 The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment
of the United States Constitution is often cited by social media users as justification for the
content of online posts. See David L. Hudson, Jr., In the Age of Social Media, Expand the
Reach of the First Amendment, HUM. RTS. MAG. (Oct. 2018). Accordingly, social media users
often use the First Amendment to justify the content of their posts and further argue
against the removal of that content. See id. at 2. However, the First Amendment applies
only to state action and not that of private companies. See id. at 3. Hence, the First
Amendment currently does not protect users’ speech on privately-owned social media
platforms. See id. at 2.
277 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2333; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339 (explaining the applicable
terrorism statutes).
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removing some immunity provided to social media platforms will
allow plaintiffs to bring claims before the courts. Furthermore,
amending the Anti-Terrorism Act and incorporating domestic
terrorist attacks will give victims of domestic terrorism attacks an
added layer of support in raising claims against social media
companies. Accordingly, such steps should be taken to ensure
justice for victims and ensure the regulation of social media
terrorism.

